本文目录
- 概括马伯里诉麦迪逊案
- 马伯里诉麦迪逊案英文原文
- unconstitutional 什么意思
- 无疑的英语翻译 无疑用英语怎么说
- 英国君主立宪制的英文介绍有木有
- 美国宪法第一案详细情况
- 三权分立的英文怎么说
- specifically是什么意思
- 求以UN开头表否定意义的动词类似undo之类的词 越多越好~3q
概括马伯里诉麦迪逊案
威廉·马伯里被即将离任的约翰·亚当斯总统任命为太平绅士。1801年，参议院批准了这一任命。但是，由于官僚的疏忽，当时的国务卿约翰·马歇尔没有向马伯里派出正式的委任状。下一任总统托马斯·杰佛逊指令他的国务卿麦迪逊不要将委任状投递给马伯利，因为他是联邦党员，而非民主共和党员，执政时任命的。
根据国会于1789年颁布的《司法法案》，马伯里在美国最高法院一审起诉麦迪逊，要求最高法院颁布训令状，命令麦迪逊将委任状投递给他。
扩展资料：
马伯里诉麦迪逊案件的深远意义：
1、从司法角度来看，本案堪称法律史上最伟大的判例。它在美国宪法史上有着极为重要的地位，奠定了近代司法权真正的权威；在全世界范围而言，这个判例也是开创违宪审查的先河。
2、阐释了为维护宪法权威必须建立违宪审查机制的道理。现在世界上，除了由普通法院作违宪审查之外，还存在由宪法法院、宪法委员会和议会等作违宪审查的模式。
3、将权利救济列入法治国家的衡量标准，确立了司法最终原则。
参考资料来源：百度百科-马伯利诉麦迪逊案
马伯里诉麦迪逊案英文原文
Marbury v. Madison (1803)（《马伯里诉麦迪逊案》英文稿）（上）
约翰·马歇尔文 发表：选自Info USA/2001年4月；学术交流网/美国历史文献/2002年11月4日转发
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Just as George Washington helped shape the actual form that the executive branch would take, so the third chief justice, John Marshall, shaped the role that the courts would play.
Under the administrations of Washington and his successor, John Adams, only members of the ruling Federalist Party were appointed to the bench, and under the terms of the Constitution, they held office for life during “good behavior.“ Thus, when the opposing Republicans won the election of 1800, the Jeffersonians found that while they controlled the presidency and Congress, the Federalists still dominated the judiciary. One of the first acts of the new administration was to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1800, which had created a number of new judgeships. Although President Adams had attempted to fill the vacancies prior to the end of his term, a number of commissions had not been delivered, and one of the appointees, William Marbury, sued Secretary of State James Madison to force him to deliver his commission as a justice of the peace.
The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law.
Marshall’s decision in this case has been hailed as a judicial tour de force. In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court order would be flouted.
The critical importance of Marbury is the assumption of several powers by the Supreme Court. One was the authority to declare acts of Congress, and by implication acts of the president, unconstitutional if they exceeded the powers granted by the Constitution. But even more important, the Court became the arbiter of the Constitution, the final authority on what the document meant. As such, the Supreme Court became in fact as well as in theory an equal partner in government, and it has played that role ever since.
The Court would not declare another act of Congress unconstitutional until 1857, and it has used that power sparingly. But through its role as arbiter of the Constitution, it has, especially in the twentieth century, been the chief agency for the expansion of individual rights. (See Part V.)For further reading: George L. Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 (1981); Donald O. Dewey, Marshall v. Jefferson: The Political Background of Marbury v. Madison (1970).
Marbury v. Madison
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the last term on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case, requiring the Secretary of State to show cause why amandamus should not issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia.
No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded. . . .
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided:
1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2d. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
3d. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The first object of inquiry is -- 1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? . . .
It [is] decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete, when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary of state. . . .
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right This brings us to the second inquiry; which is 2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
[The] government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. . . .
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and beingentrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. . . .
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy. . . .
It is, then, the opinion of the Court [that Marbury has a] right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be enquired whether,
3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on --
1st. The nature of the writ applied for, and,
2dly. The power of this court.
1st. The nature of the writ. . . .
This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be enquired,Whether it can issue from this court.
（下接中篇，待续）
Marbury v. Madison (1803)（《马伯里诉麦迪逊案》英文稿）（中）
约翰·马歇尔文 发表：选自Info USA/2001年4月；学术交流网/美国历史文献/2002年11月4日转发
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
（上接上篇）
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court “to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States.“
The Secretary of State, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officerit must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congreess shall, from time to time,ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.“
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme and inferior courts, is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, contains no negative or restrictive words, the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and
original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.
If the solicitude of the convention, respecting our peace with foreign powers, induced a provision that the supreme court should take original jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases, if no further restriction on the powers of congress had been intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such exceptions as congress might make, is no restriction; unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.
To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and, therefore, seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future govern-ment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is, conse-quently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.
（下接下篇，待续）
-unconstitutional
unconstitutional 什么意思
unconstitutional
英 [ˌʌnˌkɒnstɪˈtju:ʃənl] 美 [ˌʌnˌkɑ:nstəˈtu:ʃənl]
adj. 违反宪法的，不符合章程[法规]的
-unconstitutional
无疑的英语翻译 无疑用英语怎么说
无疑的_
释义：
There is no doubt that,certain,doubtless,questionless,incontrovertible,indubitable
短语：
无疑的 certain;out of question;undoubted无疑的事实 a positive fact确定无疑的违宪 Unconstitutional Beyond Dispute
-unconstitutional
英国君主立宪制的英文介绍有木有
The Constitutional Monarchy
The political system of UK is constitutional monarchy, a system of government in which a king or queen acts as Head of State, while the ability to make and pass legislation resides with an elected parliament. Contrary to absolutism or absolute monarchy where a monarchy rules with total power, the power of the monarch under constitutional monarchy is restrained by a parliament, by law or by custom; as in the United Kingdom the Sovereign reigns but does not rule.
The hereditary monarchy is the oldest secular institution of government in the UK, with roots that can be traced back to the Saxons who ruled from the 5th until the Norman Conquest in 1066. In over 1000 years, its continuity has been broken only once by Cromwell’s “Commonwealth”, which lasted from the execution of Charles I to the restoration of Charles II.
The origins of the constitutional monarchy, however, go back to the time when the leading nobles of England succeeded in forcing King John to sign the Magna Carta in 1215. Until the end of 17th century, British monarchs were executive monarchs, enjoying the rights to make and pass legislation.
The real sense constitutional monarchy started from the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the subsequent Bill of Rights of 1689, which established basic tenets such as the supremacy of parliament. By the reign of George V, the principle of constitutional monarchy was firmly established in Britain. The constitutional monarchy we know today really developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, as day-to-day power came to be exercised by ministers in Cabinet and by Parliaments by a steadily-widening electorate.
In modern Britain, where class and privilege are no longer as important as they used to be, an institution like monarchy might seem obsolete. However, any serious attempt to abolish the monarchy would meet with violent opposition from all sectors of British society.
What then is the use of having a Monarch?
As a system of government, constitutional monarchy has its strengths. One is that it separates out the ceremonial and official duties of Head of State from party politics. Walter Bagehot, one of the most important Victorian writers on the subject of constitutional monarchy, describes the way in which monarchy symbolize the unity of the national community. “The nation is divided into parties, but the crown is of no party. Its apparent separation from business is that which removes it both from enmities and from desecration, which preserves its mystery, which enables it to combine the affection of conflicting parties...”
Besides, from the point of view of political power, according to Bagehot, the main influence of Sovereign is during a political ministry, for Sovereign has three rights: “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn”. A Sovereign would, over the course of a long reign, accumulate far more knowledge and experience than any minister. Even though the Queen could do nothing to alter Cabinet decisions and never refuses her assent to something she disagrees with because she knows this would be unconstitutional, she sometimes has a definite and beneficial influence on the kind of decisions taken.
More than this, the constitutional monarchy focus, as a long-established tradition, provides a sense of stability, continuity and a national focus, since the Head of State remains the same even as governments and politicians come and go according to elections won or lost. The Monarch is always there, above party quarrels, representing the nation as a whole, and lending dignity and significance to all things done in her name. The system bridges the discontinuity in times of political and social change. With more than five decades of reading State papers, meeting Heads of State and ambassadors and holding a weekly audience with the Prime Minister, The Queen has an unequalled store of experience upon which successive Prime Ministers have been able to draw.
The British Monarchy is the supreme illustration of the way British institutions develop. Violent upheavals are rare. Instead, the existing is slowly modified to suit fresh conditions, until in the end the impossible is achieved—a completely new system which still looks exactly like the old. And the pride of the British is that although it is illogical, it works.
译文：
君主立宪制
英国的政治体制是君主立宪制，即国王或王后担任国家元首的政府制度，而制定和通过立法的能力则由选举产生的议会负责。君主专制统治下的君主专制主义或专制君主政体，君主立宪制下君主的权力受到议会、法律或习俗的制约；在英国，君主统治但不统治。
世袭君主制是英国最古老的世俗政体，其根源可追溯到第五至1066年诺尔曼征服的撒克逊人。在1000多年的时间里，克伦威尔的“联邦”一次打破了它的连续性，从查尔斯一世的执行到查理二世的复辟。
君主立宪制的渊源，然而，回去的时候，英国的贵族，成功地迫使约翰国王1215签署大宪章。直到十七世纪底，英国君主都是行政君主，享有制定和通过立法的权利。
真正意义上的君主立宪制是从1688的光荣革命和后来的《1689权法案》开始的，该法案确立了议会至上等基本原则。乔治五世统治时期，英国确立了君主立宪的原则。我们今天所知道的君主立宪制确实发展于第十八和第十九世纪，因为内阁和议会中的部长们的日常权力由不断扩大的选民行使。
在现代英国，阶级和特权不再像过去那么重要了，像君主政体这样的机构似乎过时了。然而，任何废除君主制的严肃企图都会遭到英国社会各阶层的强烈反对。
那么，拥有君主又有什么用呢？
君主立宪制作为一种政体，有其自身的优势。其一是将国家元首的礼仪和公务从政党政治中分离出来。Walter Bagehot，一个在君主立宪制的主体最重要的维多利亚时代的作家，介绍的方式，王权象征民族共同体的统一。这个国家分为两个党派，但这个国家没有党派。其表观与商业分离，删除它从仇恨和亵渎，保留它的神秘，这使它能够将冲突双方的感情…
此外，从政治的角度来看，Bagehot认为，主权的主要影响是政治部期间，主权有三项权利：“商量权，正确的鼓励，警告权”。在漫长的统治过程中，君主会比其他大臣积累更多的知识和经验。即使女王不能改变内阁的决定，也从不拒绝她不同意的东西，因为她知道这是违反宪法的，她有时对所做的决定有明确和有益的影响。
更重要的是，君主立宪制作为一个由来已久的传统，提供了一种稳定、连续性和国家重点的意识，因为国家元首仍然是相同的，即使政府和政治家根据选举的胜利或失败而来或去。君主总是站在那里，超越党派纷争，代表整个国家，为她所做的一切事情赋予尊严和意义。在政治和社会变革的时代，这一体系是桥梁的桥梁。拥有超过五年的阅读报纸，国家和大使首脑会议持每周的观众与首相，女王有一个无与伦比的存储经验的历届首相已经能够得出。
英国君主政体是英国制度发展的最高例证。暴力剧变是罕见的。相反，现有的慢慢修正以适应新的条件，直到最后不可能取得完全的新系统看起来完全一样。英国人的骄傲是，尽管它不合逻辑，但它确实有效。
-unconstitutional
美国宪法第一案详细情况
马伯里诉麦迪逊案(marbury v. madison)发生于1803年，正处于联邦党与共和党激烈争权的年代。1800年7月，联邦党众议员约翰·马歇尔(John Marshall)，在其任期届满后出任亚当斯总统的国务卿，以协助他竞选连任。在1801年的总统大选中，共和党候选人杰弗逊当选总统。联邦党遭到惨败，同时失去总统宝座和国会控制权，在三权分立的政治格局中，联邦党人损失两项权力，他们只好将剩余的希望完全寄托在司法部门以挽败局。1801年1月20日，即将离任的亚当斯总统任命马歇尔出任联邦最高法院首席大法官就是联邦党人的挣扎之举。1月27日，经参议院同意后，马歇尔于2月4日正式到职赴任。但是马歇尔并末辞去国务卿职务，只是任职不领薪直到1801年3月3日亚当斯总统任期届满。
联邦党还乘着总统及国会任期终了前作出一连串的政治安排，以图共和党主政后得以退守法院以保存联邦党的实力。其中一项就是，1801年3月2日，亚当斯任命了华盛顿郡23名以及亚历山大郡19名治安法官。这些法官在3月3日午夜以前经参议院同意、总统签署、马歇尔国务卿盖印后生效，他们即是所谓的“子夜治安法官”(midnight justias of peace)。这些法官中，有些人的任命状在3月3日晚上已由马歇尔的兄弟詹姆士送达，而另外一些人的任命状仓促之间末及发出。
1801年3月4日对联邦党人这些做法积怨已久的新上任总统杰弗逊得知有17份治安法官的任命状来不及送达，便立即指令国务卿麦迪逊拒绝发送任命状，并将这些任命状“如同办公室的废纸、垃圾一样处理了”。与此同时，共和党人控制的新国会也立即引入法案并于1802年3月8日成功地废除了《巡回法院法案》，但没有撤销有关治安法官的《哥伦比亚特区组织法》。为了防止马歇尔控制下的联邦最高法院对国会上述行为的挑战，新国会还进一步以法令形式迫使最高法院从1801年12月~1803年2月关闭了长达14个月之久。直到 1803年最高法院才再次开庭行使权力。
麦迪逊拒发任命状，引起末接到任命状但已获得法官任命者的不满。被任命为华盛顿郡的治安法官马伯里便是其中一个，他与另外三个同样情形的新法官便以1789年的司法条例(亦译司法法，Judiciary Act of 1789)第13条的规定(即联邦最高法院有权对合众国公职人员发布职务执行令状)为依据向最高法院提起诉讼，要求最高法院判决新总统杰弗逊及国务卿麦迪逊交出任命状。
马歇尔大法官正是在这样的背景下，接到了这个烫山芋。他考虑了如下三个问题：“第一，申请人是否有权利得到他所要求的委任状？第二，如果他有这个权利并且这一权利受到了侵犯，这个国家的法律是否为他提供了救济？第三，如果法律确实为申请人提供了救济，是否由本法院发出法院强制执行令？”经过一番权衡，他做出如下判决：“本院认为，委任状一经总统签署，任命即为作出；一经国务卿加盖合众国国玺，委任状即为完成。”因此对马伯里的任命有效；“本院认为：马伯里有权利得到委任状：拒发委任状侵犯了他的权利，他的国家的法律为此对他提供救济。”同时他又判决最高法院无权发出法院强制执行令。马歇尔法官在这个著名的案例中，花了大量的篇幅论证前两项判决，在其论证过程中，确立了著名的司法审查原则，他说：“所以，合众国宪法的词语确认和强化了这一应成为所有成文宪法的本质的原则，即与宪法相抵触的法律无效，法院和其他政府部门都受宪法的约束。…该命令（指麦迪逊的命令）必须予以撤销。”按照遵循先例原则，在这个判决中，马歇尔法官所确立的司法审查原则使得联邦最高法院获得了极大的权力，可以说是在众目睽睽之下，将联邦最高法院的权力扩张到无人能够想象的地步——不管共和党人是否意识到这种权力的扩张。
-unconstitutional
三权分立的英文怎么说
Separation of Powers
Background
* Ultimate sovereignty (power) in the United States resides with the people. In an attempt to govern themselves better, the people adopted the U.S. Constitution.
* Those persons present for the writing of the Constitution at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, known as the Framers, feared the concentration of too much power in any one person or governmental agency. In an attempt to prevent such an accumulation of power, the Framers wrote a Constitution with a system of checks and balances.
* Under a system of checks and balances, power is divided among different branches of government. This system is based upon the idea that each branch will be protective of its own power and, thus, prevent, intrusions upon it from other branches–thereby preventing any one branch of government from becoming too powerful.
* The U.S. Constitution established three separate but equal branches of government, the legislative branch (which makes the law), the executive branch (which enforces the law), and the judicial branch (which interprets the law).
The Legislative Branch
* Article I of the Constitution established the legislative branch. It is made up of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The number of seats in the House of Representatives that a state has is based upon its population. Each state has two seats in the Senate.
* The Constitution determines the qualifications of members of Congress, e.g., members of the House must be at least 25 years old and members of the Senate at least 30.
* A check that Congress has on the president is that the Congress must vote on whether or not it will fund the president’s initiatives. A check that Congress has on the judiciary is that it can change the jurisdiction (the courts’ ability to hear certain types of cases) of the federal courts.
The Executive Branch
* Article II of the Constitution established the executive branch. It is made up of the president, the vice-president, the cabinet, and other departments, agencies, and institutions that assist the President. The executive branch carries out a variety of functions from proposing legislation, to regulating the military, to extending diplomatic relations to different countries.
* The Constitution determines the qualifications of the president and vice-president, e.g., both must be natural-born citizens and be at least 35 years of age. Federal law and regulations usually determine the qualifications of other members of the executive branch.
* A check that the Presidents have on Congress is that they may veto Congressional bills.
The Judicial Branch
* Article III of the Constitution establishes the judicial branch. It includes the Supreme Court, the 13 U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the 94 U.S. District Courts (trial courts).
* The only qualifications that the Constitution establishes for federal judges (members of the judicial branch) is that they are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They hold office during good behavior, typically for life.
* The judiciary has a check on both the legislative and executive branches in that it can declare laws and presidential orders unconstitutional.
-unconstitutional
specifically是什么意思
specifically[英][spəˈsɪfɪkli][美][spəˈsɪfɪkli]
adv.特有地，明确地; 按种别地; 按特性地;
具体来说；明确地；具体地；特意
特别地；特定地；明确的
例句:
例句筛选
1.
Concluding, the Court specifically referred to the use of the evidence thereseized as “ unconstitutional . “
结束，法院具体地提到了对证据的用途那里被占领如「违反宪法」。
2.
The term is often used to refer specifically to the pulsed neutron spectroscopymeasurement.
这一术语常用来特指脉冲中子谱测量。
-unconstitutional
求以UN开头表否定意义的动词类似undo之类的词 越多越好~3q
1、unhappy
adj. 不快乐的；不幸福的；不适当的
2、unfit
adj. 不适宜的；不合格的；不健康的
vt. 使不合格；使不相宜；使不胜任
3、unfaithful
adj. 不忠实的；不诚实的；不准确的
4、unpleasant
adj. 讨厌的；使人不愉快的
5、unnecessary
adj. 不必要的；多余的，无用的
